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INTRODUCTION
The Spanish position during the Second World War has tradition-
ally been defined as a position of neutrality. Spain did not enter the
war and, consequently, Spain maintained neutrality. This traditional
thesis is not correct, or, at least, must be remarkably clarified. Once
World War II broke out, Spain, like Italy, declared neutrality. As
soon as Italy declared war on June 10, 1940, Spain declared non-
belligerency, which meant, in practice, supporting the Axis countries.
From June 1940, Spain bargained its entry in the war. In September-
October 1940, the relations among Spain, Germany and Italy suf-
fered a remarkable adjustment. After the meeting in Hendaya be-
tween Hitler and Franco, on October 23, 1940, Spain signed the
Protocol of Hendaya. In the third point of the Protocol, Spain joined
the Steel Pact-the political-military pact that Germany and Italy
signed in March 1939. The adhesion to the Steel Pact produced the
following benefits:
1) strong collaboration among Gestapo, OVRA, and the Spanish
police;
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2) a wider collaboration among information services, including
the High Staff, the Falange, and the Spanish diplomatic serv-
ice;
3) a wider collaboration between the High Staffs; and
4) huge economic servitudes through advantageous economic
agreements to the Axis countries.
Spain's entry in the war, however, remained unsettled. The issue
of Spanish territorial compensation remained unsettled as well. The
signing of the Tripartite Pact meant a qualitative change, as Spain le-
gally and publicly lost its status as a neutral country.'
Spain's support of the Tripartite Pact depended on the course of
the war. With the conquest of Greece and Crete, and the Axis ad-
vance in North Africa, in the spring of 1941 during the war in the
Mediterranean, the Spanish government almost promoted the signing
of the Tripartite Pact. Most observers believed that the Mediterra-
nean would be closed with the Axis conquest of both the Suez and
Gibraltar entry points. Fortunately for Spain, Hitler ordered the be-
ginning of Operation Barbarrossa in June 1941. With this, the strate-
gic scenario changed: the central military interest passed from the
Mediterranean to Eastern Europe. Spain avoided pressures to sign the
Tripartite Pact until the beginning of Operation Torch in North Af-
rica, but at this time the position of the internal forces against Spain's
entry into the war were strengthened. The Falangist minister Serrano
Sufier was replaced by General Jordana, who clearly fought to keep
Spain out of the war. General Jordana's nomination placed strong
pressures against the political power of the Falange. With the support
1. This article, in its historical aspects, is a r6sum6 of numerous studies pub-
lished by the author in the last twenty years, specifically, ANTONIO MARQUINA,
ESPANA Y LOS JUDIOS EN EL SIGLO XX, LA ACcION EXTERIOR (1987); ANTONIO
MARQUINA, ESPAIA EN LA POLITICA DE SEGURIDAD OCCIDENTAL 1939-1986
(1986); ANTONIO MARQUINA, LA DIPLOMACIA VATICANA Y LA ESPANA DE FRANCO
1939-1945 (1983); ANTONIO MARQUINA, EL IMPACTO DE LA SEGUNDA GUERRA
MUNDIAL EN EUROPA Y ESPAiA (1986); ANTONIO MARQUINA, ESPANA Y LA
SEGUNDA GUERRA MUNDIAL (1995); Antonio Marquina, L'Espagne et le
Deuxiime Conflict Mondial, in 158 GUERRES MONDIALES ET CONFLICTS
CONTEMPORAINES (1990). See also D. DETWILER, HITLER, FRANCO UND
GIBRALTAR (1962).
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of Italy and Germany, Jordana's nomination further diminished
Falange's power.'
I. ALLIED MEASURES TO ENSURE SPANISH
NEUTRALITY
From the beginning of the war, the Allies, specifically Great Brit-
ain, tried a number of policies to prevent closer relations between the
Axis and Spain- thereby inhibiting the possibility of entry in the
war. In this regard, I am going to point out some meaningful aspects
that widen the scope of the concept of neutrality during the war.
First, Spain was not permitted to trade freely with the Axis coun-
tries. The economic blockade, the export license system, and the
progressive extension of the list of commodities that Spain was pro-
hibited from exporting under the terms of the war trade agreements,
all notably reduced the free flow of goods from Spain.'
Second, the Allies created a system of incentives to condition
Spanish policy decisions. The British engaged in a policy focused on
"building a network of mutual interests and creating the conditions,
thanks to which any breakup between the two countries would mean
a key loss for the Spanish trade and industry."4 This policy condi-
tioned Spanish movements in the war.
After the German offensive on Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and France, Great Britain tested different policies to tie Spain to
Portugal and thus strengthen Spanish neutrality. One of these initia-
tives was providing Portuguese products to Spain, by including these
products in the Anglo-Spanish clearing agreement signed on March
18, 1940. Additionally, Portugal provided 100,000 tons of wheat
grain in order to lessen the famine in Spain, to stabilize the internal
situation in Spain, and to prevent the surrender of Spain to German
and Italian ambitions.
2. Antonio Marquina, El Ejdrcito y la Injerencia E'tranjera en Espafia. in
HISTORIA 16, at 21-30 (1982).
3. See 1 W.N. MEDDLICOTr, THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE (1952): P. BARROSO,
LAS RELACIONES DIPLOMATIcO-COMERCIALES HiSPANO-BRrrANICAS: 1939-1945
(1982).
4. S. HOARE, AMBASSADOR ON SPECIAL MISSION (1946).
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The reason for the success of these measures at strengthening
Spanish neutrality was simple: the Falangist and Serrano Sufier's
German- and Italian-supported, autocratic doctrines, which blocked
trade negotiations with France, Great Britain and the United States;
the lack of loans from the Allies-the United States did not want to
supply Spain with economic help without a public declaration of
neutrality-and the economic blockade, led Spain to a disastrous
economic position. Another key economic factor was oil. In the first
half of 1940, Great Britain and United States oil companies sharply
reduced the oil supply to Spain, and thus increased the possibility
that Spain would move toward the Axis countries!
With the economic agreements in force between Spain and the
United Kingdom since the Fall of 1940, Spain received, not only
products essential to its economic survival-which could only be
obtained from the Sterling area and the United States-but also the
possibility of meeting its imperative financial necessities as well.
Spain was inescapably dependent on British and Western Hemi-
spheric sources of supply.
Third, Great Britain intervened decisively in Spanish internal
politics. The profound division between the Spanish senior generals,
who had won the Spanish Civil War, and the Falange, supported by
Germany and Italy, was a perfect field for covert intervention. The
Spanish generals had created a military junta in order to oppose the
claims of Serrano Suffer and the Falange, and received the support of
the British intelligence services. The military junta was the benefici-
ary of several monetary transactions. One of them, a $10 million de-
posit to an account with the Swiss Bank Corporation of New York,
was made at the same time the junta honored its commitments to
keep Spain from entering the war.
5. See Shipment of British-controlled Oil in Tons, at 168 (Morgenthau Diary,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Book 303).
6. See Antonio Marquina, Franco Quiso Participar en ]a Segunda Guerra
Mundial, EL PAS, Nov. 19-22, 1978 & Dec. 15, 1978. This newspaper published
historical records of the Hendaya meeting, including the footnotes. For the first
time, the British bribes to the Spanish Generals were exposed. See also D. Smyth,
Les Chavalliers de Saint-George: La Grande-Bretagne et ]a Corruption des Gd-
ndraux Espagnols (1940-1942), in GUERRES MONDIALES ET CONFLICTS
CONTEMPORAINS 29-54 (vol. 162 1991).
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The junta was remarkably successful in April 1941, a critical mo-
ment for Spanish neutrality, due to the Axis advance in the Eastern
Mediterranean. Serrano Suffer was obliged to give up the Interior
Ministry to a senior soldier, Colonel Galarza. The leftist sector of
Falange, which was in the hands of the German Embassy, began to
be subdued. Eventually, after the Blue Division was committed to the
Russian front, Franco delivered an important speech before the Con-
sejo Nacional de la Falange on July 17, 1941 where he blamed the
United States for trying to marginalize Spain through its economic
aid offers, warning the United States of possible intervention in the
war, and asserting that poor planning by the Allies would result in
defeat.
The pressure of the military junta on Franco was again visible. The
junta criticized him, saying that he could not make declarations on
foreign policy without prior consultations. Great Britain and the
United States considered a change in policy. Churchill ultimately
prevented the approval of measures such as the changing wartime
consumption, ongoing Spanish trade with the Axis, the strategic
value of certain commodities, and so forth. The Allies considered it
necessary to export some products in order to maintain friendly rela-
tions with Spanish business interests and counteract Axis exports of
similar products.
Fourth, in order to minimize shipments of Spanish products to the
Axis, the Allies established a preemptive purchase system in Spain
and tried to persuade the government to establish export prohibitions
or limitations on Spanish exports. To this end, the United States and
Great Britain's products were overpriced and threatened to cut sup-
plies of several important products such as petroleum and fertilizers.
Preemption also included payments to prevent production of certain
materials and commodities. The Allies also established the Pro-
claimed and Statutory Lists.!
With these measures, the Allies supported only a minimal Spanish
economy, and obtained economic warfare concessions from Spain.
On the other hand, the Allies had a profound knowledge of Spanish
exports to the Axis countries.
7. See N.A. RG. 169, Foreign Economic Administration. Entry 151, Box
917,Spain, General and Miscellaneous Records.
1998]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
II. THE EFFECTS OF THE SPANISH ALLIANCE
WITH THE AXIS COUNTRIES
The observance of commitments with Germany and Italy meant
remarkable servitudes for Spain.8 In the political arena, the links with
the Gestapo and the Italian OVRA were very close and covered a
wide range of areas. In the case of Germany, Allied reports demon-
strate the Gestapo's control of the Spanish police. The Gestapo was
deployed throughout the country and maintained close contact with
the Falange. The Gestapo's activity had meaningful importance in
several important areas including: controlling the entry of foreigners
into Spain, the persecution of many refugees and other persons
"guilty" of Anti-Axis feelings, the imprisonment and interrogation of
Axis critics, and even kidnapping Axis detractors. This collaboration
also extended to the German occupied territories. For instance, in
Paris, relations between the Gestapo and the Spanish police were
very close. This could explain the internment of Spanish republicans
in the Mathausen Camp. Additionally, in 1944, Alisch left for Spain
before the fall of Paris, and a large part of the Gestapo looting in
Paris was sent to Spain. These close connections explain the assis-
tance of Spanish police officers and Falange personnel in securing
false documentation, changing identities, and providing sanctuary for
Germans after the war.
In the field of intelligence services, the Spanish and German intel-
ligence services were almost one and the same. There was clear col-
lusion between the services of the Spanish High Staff and the Ab-
wehr in Spain, Latin America, and North Africa. Kuehlenthal, the
head of Abteilung I of Abwehr in Madrid, made daily visits to the
headquarters of the Spanish intelligence service of the High Staff,
which was across the street from the German embassy. He conferred
mainly with the head of the Spanish intelligence service, general Ar-
senio Martinez Campos.
In the case of Falange, the Falangist intelligence services-reor-
ganized after Himmler's visit to Madrid in October 1940-estab-
lished a wide network in Spain and Latin America. During the Ser-
8. This section was prepared after consulting numerous OSS files and inter-
cepts dealing with Spain. See also Antonio Marquina. Los Servicios de Informa-
cion Aliadosy Espafia Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial (forthcoming).
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rana Suffer period, intelligence operations were facilitated through
the use of the Foreign Ministry, including the use of diplomatic per-
sonnel, and the diplomatic pouch.
The effects of Spanish and German cooperation in this area were
quite significant. For example, the Falange and the High Staff Secret
Service helped to supply German U-boats until the end of the war;
helped to introduce Spanish agents in the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Latin America; helped to network the Japanese
intelligence services; and helped to create a maritime intelligence
system comprised of a network of sailors who gave exact informa-
tion about convoys or allied vessels, who smuggled strategic materi-
als, and who acted as couriers. The Falange and the High Staff also
provided shipments of provisions to the isolated German garrisons in
Western France after the Normandy invasion. They carried out
propaganda activities favorable to the Axis, mainly in Latin America;
sabotaged allied shipping; and submitted reports of different kinds.
In June of 1940, the Falange and the High Staff Secret Service, from
their observation points on Spanish soil, regularly reported Allied
ship movements in the area of the Gibraltar Strait to the Axis coun-
tries. Especially after 1944, they also helped to hide not only looted
assets-such as art and jewels, gold, foreign currencies, properties,
and general Nazi funds in enormous quantities-but also important
Nazis who sought refuge in Spain.
The close military relationship between Spain and the Axis coun-
tries, despite the opposition of the Spanish senior generals, provided
among other benefits: permission to build or use army, air, and naval
facilities-including ports and naval bases, airfields, radio and mete-
orological stations; permission to use communication facilities for
submarines in Ifni; the commitment of the Blue Division; and manu-
facture of military material under German license.
In the economic sphere, Axis support was also very important to
Spain.9 The most important aspect of this economic relationship was
the extent of Germany's penetration of the Spanish economy, estab-
lished while providing supplies and support during the Spanish Civil
War. In this way, a network of German enterprises was created that
9. Regard the economic aspects, see R. GARCIA. FRANQUISMO Y TERCER
REICH (1994); A. VINAs ET AL., POLTICA COMERCIAL EXTERIOR DE ESPA5NA 193 1-
1975 (1979).
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maintained control of the management of important Spanish raw
materials, and control over Spanish exports, and generated a huge
debt between Spain and Germany.
As soon as World War II broke out, Spain and Germany reached a
clearing trade agreement on December 22, 1939. Hisma, the com-
pany created to provide the weapons and war material that General
Franco needed, and controlled the exports of the Nationalists, was
liquidated. Its resources were transferred to Sofindus, a property of
Rowark in Berlin and a part of the Four Years Plan. Sofindus was a
holding company supervised by the Third Reich's Ministry of Econ-
omy through Rowark. The objective of the German policy was for
Sofindus to play a direct role in the Spanish economy. Sofindus held
a number of enterprises, including trade and export companies, raw
material production companies-especially mining companies-and
service and transportation companies.
The clearing agreement signed between Spain and Germany was
not satisfactory to Spain because in a very short period of time,
Spanish exports to Germany surpassed German imports to Spain.
This created important overdrafts in the commercial clearing ac-
count, which surpassed the agreed limits. This is an essential point,
considering Sofindus used gold and foreign currencies from its capi-
tal accounts, as well as the commercial clearing account, to finance
its projects.
Before exploring this issue further, it is necessary to point out that,
after Spain readjusted its relations with Italy and Germany upon ad-
hering to the Steel Pact, Spanish exports to Germany increased quite
dramatically. From 1940 to 1941, the value of Spanish exports to
Germany increased ten-fold. Moreover, food product exports in-
creased fifteen times. While the food products flowed to Germany
and Italy, the Spanish people starved and endured great suffering.
Increased Spanish exports created an overdraft of 70 million
Reichmarks in the German-Spanish clearing account in May 1941.
The overdraft shot up to 105 million Reichmarks by the end of that
year. The Spanish government reduced the exports, especially strate-
gic minerals with military interest, and the negotiations to sign a new
commercial agreement began. A year later, in December 1942, Ger-
many and Spain signed a new trade pact. The agreement established
[ 4:171
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commercial balance as an important principle, and limited German
clearing account overdrafts to 70 million Reichmarks.
It soon became clear that Germany could no longer export the
committed commodities, producing a new bilateral tension. In
August 1943, a new agreement extended the 1942 agreement for an-
other year, committing Germany again to maintain a commercial
balance, to export 300 million Reichmarks in commodities, and to
send armament for 215.5 million Reichmarks in compensation for
the trade deficit, which increased to around 200 million Reichmarks.
Again, the situation became untenable, damaging economic relations.
Due to a German proposal in November 1943, the Spanish govern-
ment agreed to pay 100 million Reichmarks of the Spanish debt from
the Spanish Civil War. The partial debt payment and the supply of
military material changed Germany's difficult situation, allowing So-
findus to continue to carry out its mineral purchases.
The United States, as an immediate consequence of Spain's poli-
cies, doubled oil prices and, after the incident surrounding the Span-
ish government's telegram to the puppet Filipino leader Laurel, the
United States government suspended shipments of petroleum prod-
ucts to Spain on January 29, 1944. The negotiations between Spain,
the United Kingdom, and the United States to solve this issue lasted
several months. Finally, on May 2, 1944, an agreement was reached.
The Spanish government committed itself to restrict wolfram ship-
ments to Germany, and to take steps to prevent the smuggling of
wolfram; to submit the question of the possible release of Italian
warships and the delivery of five Italian merchant ships to arbitra-
tion; to close the German consulate in Tangier; to expel the Axis es-
pionage and sabotage agents from Spain and the Spanish North Afri-
can territories; to withdraw the Spanish soldiers from the Russian
Front; and to make available to the United States and Great Britain
all necessary facilities for the purchase and export of Spanish prod-
ucts."0
Spain did not completely honor this agreement. From the begin-
ning, the Allies knew that Spanish Minister Carceller and other ac-
commodating officials would give practical support to exports di-
10. See J. TUSELL, FRANcO, ESPAINA Y LA II GuERRA MUNDIAL 497-517
(1995).
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rected to Germany, including the wolfram. In this way, Germany se-
cretly imported huge quantities of wolfram during 1944." This also
meant enriching personalities like the Fierro family. Given the se-
crecy of the shipments, Spain earned very little in taxes and custom
duties while the Spanish economy and the Spanish people suffered
considerably because oil prices doubled.
One issue that has never been satisfactorily studied is the financing
of all these purchases and exports by Sofindus.'2 Traditionally, the
explanation was that Spain bought gold from Germany, Portugal,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom using the overdrafts from the
commercial clearing account. This explanation is insufficient. Sofin-
dus, especially in 1942 and 1943, maintained huge credit balances in
Spain. During the first years of the war, Spanish banks stood ready at
any time to furnish additional credit should it be needed. However,
the credits had to be paid. By the middle of 1943, Germany in fact
had largely exhausted its credit in Spain. Sofindus had to finance in-
vestments, purchase minerals, pay salaries, pay taxes, pay export du-
ties, and so forth, using Swiss Francs or gold-guaranteed credits.
These transactions have not been studied thoroughly, although
they must be studied to clarify the gold traffic-especially those of
Banco Exterior, Banesto, Banco Hispanoamericano, Banco Alemiin
Transatl~ntico and Banco Germanico de America del Sur-as well as
the wide traffic of foreign exchange carried out by Germany with the
collusion, in many cases, of Spanish officials. It is necessary to care-
fully study the conversion of Reichmarks to Pesetas; Swiss francs
and Swiss gold to Pesetas; Portuguese escudos and Portuguese gold
to Pesetas; and French francs and different currencies in North Africa
to Pesetas. The study must not limit itself to Portugal and Switzer-
land, the two states that were the bankers of the Third Reich, but also
to Tangier, Spain, France, Germany, and even Turkey. The gold and
foreign currency traffic was constant and vast. We can also add to
this investigation of these activities, the enrichment of important
11. For instance, see N.A.R.G. 457, cryptointercepts, from Madrid to Berlin,
Box 400, File 113401-113701 (Feb. 11, 1944) (on file with author).
12. Different authors who have researched the Sofindus do not make a suffi-
cient distinction between the capital account and the commercial account. This
leads to errors in evaluating the financial needs of Sofindus during the war.
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people such as lawyers, politicians, officials, and businessmen from
the Franco regime who escaped the Spanish monetary authorities.
Nevertheless, from 1943, one can detect a change in the Spanish
policy toward a more neutral foreign policy. Spain allowed hundreds
of refugees from France to pass through its territory. The vast major-
ity of these refugees were men of military age, many of them were
French officers determined to reach Allied territory. They also were
permitted to depart from Spain. Spanish territory was also used by
Allied secret services as a base for espionage operations directed
against the Germans in contiguous-occupied territory with the pas-
sive collaboration of certain Spanish authorities.'3 These activities
were extremely important before the Normandy invasion. In moving
toward neutrality, General Franco announced, in his October 1, 1943
speech, Spain had once more assumed a position of neutrality.
The influence of the signed agreements with Germany, the influ-
ence of Falange in the Franco regime, Germanophilia, and bad analy-
sis of the intelligence services of the High Staff and Franco himself,
however, hindered a true position of neutrality until the end of the
war." There is no evidence that Spain denounced the secret agree-
ments signed with Germany. Later, in the final months of 1944, the
Spanish policy was to play the winning side, while maintaining im-
portant support for Germany. This was the case in negotiating an air
transport agreement between Spain and the United States, finally
signed on December 2, 1944, and an additional Protocol for the Air
Transport Command annexed in February 1945. This double game
was maintained until the end of the war.
In the meantime, the Allied embassies protested the non-
compliance with the May 1944 agreement, providing details that
showed the depth of the Spanish links with Germany. '" For us, the
most significant aspect of this information was the hiding of German
assets and the use of Spain as a heaven for many Germans.
In June 1945, the British military attache, Brigadier Tort, informed
London that, according to their assessments, there were some 20,000
13. One example of these operations was the so-called "Medusa" operation.
14. See Antonio Marquina, La Permanencia del Regimen Franquista Despuds
de la Segunda Guerra MundiaL EL PAIS, May 23-25. 27. 1980.
15. See PRO, FO 371/49548, 49549, 49550 (on file with author).
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Germans in Spain, many still free and active, and most of them with
money and property. These Germans were aided and covered up by
the Falange and, to some extent, by the High Staff, which maintained
its pro-German sentiment and remained in close contact with the
Germans in Spain. 6
The Safehaven program in Spain was thus especially difficult for
the Allies. The Germans made preparations for hiding assets, jewels,
gold, foreign currencies, looted art, securities, and properties long
before the end of the war. Due to the lack of Spanish documentation,
it is difficult to assess the value of all these properties and assets. Es-
timates by the United States value German official, and quasi-official
as well as private assets in Spain at $95 million.
Likewise, the Allies made a huge effort to counteract the activities
of the Nazi refugees in Spain, and to prevent the establishment of a
Nazi organization to continue their activities in Spain. The Allies ne-
gotiated with the Spanish Government the liquidation and selling of
German enterprises and other properties. They also established dif-
ferent categories of German nationals for their expulsion, and finally
returned thousands of people to Germany. Nevertheless, Spanish of-
ficials informed the Germans of their pending arrests. Members of
the Gestapo also received special police passports, which were valid
until March 1946. In this way, some escaped and others were hidden
from the Allies.
To all this, we can add the support of the United States intelli-
gence services to the German rings and personalities. In 1947, the
Central Intelligence Agency had the opportunity to reorganize the
German network in Spain and other countries for its own objec-
tives. 8 The consequences for democracy and human rights have been
very negative in all these countries.
16. SeePRO, FO 371/49610, Z 593 (on file with author).
17. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED WARTIME POSTWAR RELATIONS
AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN AND TURKEY
ON LOOTED GOLD AND GERMAN EXTERNAL ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT
THE FATE OF THE WARTIME USTASHA TREASURY (1998).
18. ARE, Espagne, Z, leg 81, Madrid 16, 18 Octobre and 4 Novembre 1948.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we can highlight that Spain, after signing the Steel
Pact, was not a legally neutral country during World War II. Spain.
although its assistance was predicated on the weakness of its eco-
nomic structure and its inescapable dependence on British and West-
ern Hemispheric supply sources, helped the Axis in every possible
way. Additionally, Spain also procured significant amounts of essen-
tial commodities for the Allies' use.
In this case, Spain never applied the classic concept of neutrality
in international law. International law imposed on neutral states the
duties of abstention and neutrality. Likewise, international law
granted neutral states freedom to establish commercial relations and
guaranteed the inviolability of their territory. Spain. however, was
subjected to a series of economic warfare measures and restrictions
imposed by the Allies that did provide for Spanish neutrality. Spain
was considered a country aligned with the Axis countries. Spain, on
the other hand, continued normal commercial relations with France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States since the beginning of
World War II. More specifically, Minister Ram6n Serrano Sufier de-
fended the autocratic economic doctrines of the Falange and argued
that Spain would have otherwise been politically conditioned by its
economic agreements with France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Spain, moreover, granted secret military facilities to the Axis
states until the end of the war. Spain granted similar benefits to the
United States in late 1944 and early 1945. All of these measures
contradicted the international legal duties of neutral states.
Since World War II, the concept of neutrality also assumed having
sufficient capacity and power necessary to keep an equal distance
between both parties involved in the war since a system of collective
security did not exist. Spain did not possess this capacity. On the
contrary, Spain had previously been profoundly conditioned by the
aid it received from the Axis countries in order to win its Civil War.
This balance was therefore neither possible nor feasible under these
conditions. Moreover, in Hendaya, Spain had no other alternative
than to accept the conditions and role that the Axis countries had as-
signed for Spain. On the other hand, Spain believed that Germany
would win the war. Spain's shift toward a more clear posture of neu-
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trality came late and was incomplete, allowing and supporting the
escape of thousands of German officials, providing refuge for these
officials in Spain and Latin America, and hiding looted assets and
properties.
The question of morality regarding Spanish policy is not easy to
summarize. The Franco regime, as we said, had won the Spanish
civil war with the support of Germany and Italy. The civil war was
legitimized, from Franco's side, as a fight against communism. After
Germany made a pact with Russia in August 1939, which led to the
start of World War II. After this, the Spanish government had tre-
mendous difficulty finding a justification for entering the war. With
the German attack on Russia, the Franco regime could justify helping
Germany as a continuation of the fight against communism. The pro-
found animosity that Franco's Regime felt towards communism, as a
consequence of the Spanish Civil War, would explain the support
that Spain showed for Germany until the end of the war. Spain feared
the dangers of communism and considered the defeat of Germany to
be a disaster for the Western world since Russia would obtain new
opportunities for the advance of communism in Europe.
But the importance of moral considerations was relative compared
to the pressures from belligerent states. After 1940, Spain shared a
border with Germany. Spain, even considering the likelihood of a
German invasion and taking into account the importance of helping
Germany fight against the Communists Russia, aided Nazi Germany
beyond what was politically prudent and morally acceptable. Spain,
by implementing policies that aided German looting, and providing
personal enrichment to businessmen, officials, lawyers, members of
the Falange, and bankers, is directly related to the suffering of Jews
and other people opposing the Nazi and Fascist dictatorship in
Europe. Many of these people, especially the Jews, were murdered
and deprived of their property. Moreover, we cannot forget the con-
sequences to the Spanish people of a policy dedicated to the survival
of a political regime.
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